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The Invisible Hands That Control Translation
Doug Robinson
University of Mississippi. USA
This paper is part of an unfinished book-
length project; I have provided hypertext
links to some snippets from that project to
give you some sense of the bigger picture.
Basically, however, the project is an
attempt to explore the nature of the
«agencies» that control translation (the
individual translator? the source author?
the target culture, in the form of the mar-
ketplace? technology?) by looking closely
at an analogy that has not been explored
before: that between translation and spi-
rit-channeling —communicating with
and/or mediating for others the spirits of
dead or «discarnate» people. When trans-
lators say that their job is to «step aside
and let the original author speak through
them», I’m suggesting, that is close
enough to what is traditionally thought
of as spirit-channeling or psychic com-
munication with the dead to make the
analogy potentially worth exploring. The
translator is a «medium» or mediator who
channels the «spirit» or voice or meaning
or intention of the source author across
linguistic and cultural and temporal
barriers to a new audience that could not
have understood that source author wit-
hout such mediation. The translator does
not speak in his or her own voice; s/he
speaks in the voice of the original author.
The translator does not convey to the tar-
get audience his or her own ideas, mean-
ings, arguments, images; s/he is a neutral
and noncommittal conduit to the target
audience of the ideas and meanings of the
original author. (For a short history of
spirit-channeling [link].)
The analogy suggests both
(a) that the source author has the
power to initiate communication with
the target audience through the transla-
tor (the author is active, the translator is
passive, or at the very most active only in
the act of surrendering his/her activity to
that of the author), and
(b) that the translator possesses some
means of gaining access to the author’s
voice and meaning, of reliably «opening
up» to the intentional speaking of a per-
son who is almost invariably other (some-
times translators translate source texts they
wrote themselves, but usually the source
author is another person), most often dis-
tant in time and place, and not infre-
quently dead.
(For more detailed philosophical rumi-
nations on these two claims in terms of
the unknowability of the Kantian Ding-
an-sich [link]. For a discussion of the pro-
blem in terms of universalism and
relativism [link].)
And indeed historically many transla-
tions have been presented as explicitly
channelled from the spirit world. St. Paul
wrote to the Corinthians that when they
speak in tongues (what we might call spi-
rit-channelled foreign-language skills) they
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should also pray for the ability to inter-
pret what the glossolalists speak; this lat-
ter would be spirit-channelled conference
interpreting. The belief that certain Bible
translations are «divinely inspired» is fun-
damentally a belief that they were spirit-
channeled. (For further discussion of
spirit-channeled translations and inter-
pretations in Christianity [link].) Joseph
Smith also claimed to translate The Book
of Mormon [link] from the ancient
Egyptian through spirit-channeling.
What interests me here, however, is the
range of ways in which this idea has been
secularized in Western thought as an
expression of our continuing sense —des-
pite two-plus millennia of emerging ratio-
nalism and the now-dominant belief that
we are the captains of our own souls—
that there are forces both outside us and
inside us that wield us as their tools. In
the rationalist model that prevails in most
translation theory (indeed in most the-
ory period), the translator is a rational
agent in control of his or her actions,
including speech and thought; when the
translator must make a decision, at wha-
tever level —whether to translate a text,
how to translate a text, what word or
phrase to use, etc.— s/he acts as a single
unified being under the command of a
single unified ruler, reason. Reason ga-
thers intelligence, charts a course of
action, gives a series of commands, and
carries them out. There are no competing
forces inside the translator’s head. Nor is
reason an external force, wielded by God
or spirits or other people: it is the trans-
lator, the translator’s mind, the truest core
of the translator’s professional being.
Other people can exert coercive influen-
ce on the translator, but the translator
only surrenders to such coercion if rea-
son decides that this is the wisest course.
Clearly, the spirit-channeling model
flies right in the face of this rationalist tra-
dition. It posits an entire army of what
Adam Smith famously called «invisible
hands», which shape, direct, regulate, con-
trol translation. Indeed, one of those
«invisible hands» would be reason itself,
which ideology theorists beginning with
Friedrich Nietzsche would identify as an
internalized form of ideological mastery,
the voice of external social control that
commands the individual from inside his
or her own head. Just as the spirit seizes or
possesses the channel and speaks or other-
wise operates through the channel’s
willing body, so too does ideology and its
agents —including reason— seize or pos-
sess the ideological subject and wield
[link] that subject’s body as (virtually) its
own.
In fact Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals
offers an early, powerful, and extremely
influential statement of the shaping of the
individual by collective forces. Nietzsche’s
work was complicated in influential ways
by the French neomarxist theorist Louis
Althusser [link], in what he calls «inter-
pellation» or hailing: just as the spirit hails
the channel through whom he or she wi-
shes to speak —appearing before for the
clairvoyant, welling up inside her head a
verbal like pressure begging to be releas-
ed for the clairaudient— so too does ide-
ology hail the translator as translator, the
critic as critic, any other subject as sub-
ject. How did we learn what to do when
we first began to translate? Readers, edi-
tors, users, teachers gave us feedback;
channeling that feedback, we were chan-
neling ideology. Our «helpers» channeled
it to us; we channel it to others. They
hailed us as translators; we hail others.
Translators know certain things: how to
regulate the degree of «fidelity» with the
source text, how to tell what degree and
type of fidelity is appropriate in specific
use contexts, how to receive and deliver
translations, how to charge for them, how
to find help with terminology, how to talk
and generally act like a professional, and
so on. Translators are those people
who know these things, and who let their
knowledge govern their behavior. And
that knowledge is ideological. It is con-
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trolled by ideological norms. To know
what those norms prescribe and act upon
them is to submit to control by them. To
become a translator is to be hailed or
interpellated as a translator by what
Althusser calls ideological state apparatus-
es, or what Adam Smith would call the
«invisible hand» of the market. (For
Jacques Derrida on Marx and capitalist
spectrality [link].) If you want to become
a translator, you must submit to the trans-
lator’s submissive role, submit to being
«possessed» by what ideological norms
inform you is the spirit of the source au-
thor, and to channeling that spirit
unchanged into the target language. What
you are then channeling, in this ideolo-
gical perspective, is no such thing, of
course; Althusser at least would certainly
want to insist that there are no spirits in
the occult sense of discarnate persons,
disembodied beings who once lived on
this earth; this is all a myth propagated
by societal authorities who want to fill
that myth’s empty husk with their own
author-functions (to invoke a Foucauldian
term), their own generalized «intentions»
for transmission from language to lan-
guage.
Let’s now take a closer look at Adam
Smith’s references to an «invisible hand»
[link]—that mysterious force that leads
merchants in a free market to promote
collective interests while intending only
to satisfy self-interest. As Emma Roths-
child notes, Smith used the phrase twice
in economic contexts. The first mention
comes in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(1759), where it is used sardonically to
describe rapacious entrepreneurs for
whom the common good is the last thing
on their mind, but who nevertheless in
the pursuit of their own «vain and insa-
tiable desires» (quoted in Rothschild 319)
do provide work to thousands: «They are
led by an invisible hand to… without
intending it, without knowing it, advan-
ce the interest of the society» (quoted in
Rothschild 319). The second and more
famous mention comes in The Wealth of
Nations (1776): «he is in this, as in many
other cases, led by an invisible hand to
promote an end which is no part of his
intention» (quoted in Rothschild 319).
But as long as economic historians and
theorists have only read those two passa-
ges, the invisible hand has remained a
puzzle. Did Smith, a religious sceptic,
mean God, or some other deistic spirit?
If not, what did he mean? What «invisi-
ble» force wielded economic agents to
ends other than their own?
Rothschild works to answer these ques-
tions by tracing what amounts to a logo-
logy [link] of the invisible hand,
beginning with a naturalistic context in
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, where one hero
stabs his opponent in the back: «twisted
and plied his invisible hand, inflicting
wound within wound». Here the hand is
invisible not because the body to which
it is attached is spiritual, ghostly, super-
natural, but because it is behind the vic-
tim’s back and so cannot be seen. The
next context, rather more spiritualistic, is
in Shakespeare’s Macbeth:
Come, seeling night
Scarf up the tender eye of pitiful day,
And with thy bloody and invisible hand
Cancel and tear to pieces that great bond
Which keeps me pale! (3.2.46-50)
Here «seeling night» is personified as
a violent spirit invoked by Macbeth to
calm his conscience: his thoughts of the
men he has murdered, which «should
indeed have died / With them they think
on» (3.2.10-11), live on to torment him.
The third context, then, is Smith’s first:
in The History of Astronomy, probably
written in the early to mid-1750s, a hand-
ful of years before The Theory of Moral
Sentiment (and only published posthu-
mously in 1795). «He is talking», Roths-
child writes, «about the credulity of
people in polytheistic societies, who
ascribe ‘the irregular events of nature’,
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such as thunder and storms, to ‘intelli-
gent though invisible beings —to gods,
demons, witches, genii, fairies’. They do
not ascribe divine support to ‘the ordi-
nary course of things’: ‘nor was the invi-
sible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to
be employed in those matters’ […]»
(319). Here the invisible hand is clearly
spiritualistic and divine, almost monot-
heistic: Jupiter as the greatest of the gods
has often been made a figure (or logolo-
gical precursor) for the «supreme being» of
monotheistic Christianity. Later, also, bet-
ween The Theory of Moral Sentiment and
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations, in a lecture series
delivered in 1762-1763 —the Lectures on
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres— Smith referred
to «fairies, Nymphs, Fawns, Satyrs,
Dryads, and such divinities» as «invisible
powers» (quoted in Rothschild 320). The
logological movement is clearly from
naturalistic human hands that are invisi-
ble because hidden from the eyes, through
the unseen controlling influence of ani-
mistic or deistic spirits, to some sort of
unspecified economic force.
Working out just what that economic
force was, what Smith could have meant
by the market’s invisible hand, has in the
twentieth century become an entire cot-
tage industry in political economics —as
Rothschild notes, Smith’s commentators
paid little attention to the invisible hand
before the twentieth century (319), pos-
sibly because before Marx, Darwin, and
Freud there was no secular model of
disaggregate agency that would account
for a locus of regulation outside that secu-
lar avatar of God, the rationalist self.
Indeed as Rothschild shows, «the invisible
hand is un-Smithian» [link] (320). Smith
too sought to purify the rationalist model
of the self of any supernatural or other-
wise unexplainable or unmasterable
influences. Rationalism must be just as
monotheistic as the Platonic Christianity
out of which it largely emerged: thou shalt
have no other selves before me. Economic
agents should be the sovereign masters of
their own fates. The only forces acting on
them should be other economic agents
who are similarly masters of their own
fates. Certainly there should be no incur-
sion of «invisible hands» from superna-
tural or psychological realms whose very
existence, if it could be proven, would
shake the foundations of rationalism. As
Carl Menger wrote in 1883, in
Untersuchungen über die Methode der
Soczialwissenschaften und der politischen
Oekonomie insbesondere («Investigations
into the Method of the Social Sciences
and Political Economics In Particular»),
Smith and his later followers viewed «the
institutions of economy […] [as] the
intended product of the common will of
society or of positive legislation […] The
broad realm of unintentionally created
social structures remains closed to their
theoretical comprehension» (quoted in
Williamson 323).
It was Menger’s view, in fact, foresha-
dowing a whole host of twentieth-century
theories of the almost infinite diffusion of
control in both society and the psyche,
that «law, language, the state, money, mar-
kets, […] [the] prices of goods, interest
rates, ground rents, wages, and a thousand
other phenomena [are] to no small extent
the unintended result of social develop-
ment» (quoted in Williamson 323). As
Menger posed the key question for the
social sciences: «How can it be that insti-
tutions which serve the common welfare
and are extremely significant for its deve-
lopment come into being without a com-
mon will directed toward establishing
them?» (quoted in Williamson 323). Or,
as Robert Nozick has most influentially
reframed that question for late-twentieth-
century political economics, «what decen-
tralized competing processes within an
individual» —and, by sociological exten-
sion, within groups of individuals or an
entire society or economy— «would give
rise to a (relatively) coherent decision-
maker?» («Explanations» 314).
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Drawing on the work of the philoso-
pher Daniel Dennett (Consciousness
Explained, 1991), Nozick calls his model
a «disaggregated theory of the self» [link]:
whether we imagine the relevant econo-
mic agent as an individual translator (say,
a freelancer or an in-house person) or as
a group of people who make a variety of
contributions to the final translation pro-
duct (say, an agency, including freelance
translators, the translator’s expert helpers
[link], freelance editors, in-house editors
and project managers, even in many cases
the end-users [link] themselves), the
assumption is that there is no single uni-
fied rational control of the translation
process. The various agents and part-
agents in this process all «channel» other
significant forces —not spirits, necessa-
rily, but for the most part those other for-
ces are just as «invisible» as spirits, because
we are typically connected to them
through various virtual/prosthetic com-
munication channels, including tele-
phones, faxes, and e-mail, which do not
bring us into the physical or even visual
presence of the other.
Indeed the main unwritten part of this
project will deal extensively with the fi-
gure of the cyborg in translation —the
cybernetic organism or human-machine
interface that relies heavily on the ghostly
presences of virtuality and prosthetic
sociality. This would be the field nor-
mally described as «machine translation»
(MT), except that MT researchers des-
pair of ever programming a machine to
produce a translation of professionally
usable quality without human assistan-
ce. All MT systems are, in fact, already
cyborg translation systems: they all requi-
re a human-machine interface. The ima-
gination of the cyborg translator comes,
of course, from science fiction [link],
where the linguistic complexity of space
travel is often bypassed with various
translator prosthetics that operate like
technologically channeled spirits: just as
Paul’s glossolalists open their mouths and
interpretations of their colleagues’ foreign
words come out, channeled from the
Holy Spirit, so too do various sf space
travelers open their mouths and utter
words in languages they do not know, or
open their ears and understand words in
similarly unfamiliar languages. The prost-
hetic devices turn them into cyborg trans-
lators who become able to «channel»
foreign speech into the target language
of the (usually monolingual) sf writer and
reader. In fact, the Urim and Thummim
was a prosthetic device that made it pos-
sible for Joseph Smith to translate The
Book of Mormon [link] from the ancient
Egyptian; during the 45 days during
which he dictated the translation, wit-
hout even looking at the ancient
Egyptian golden tablets, Smith was him-
self a cyborg translator.
But then, in a broader sense, so are we
all.
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